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**THE BOARD OF PEACE:
STRUCTURE, POLITICAL LOGIC, AND
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS**

By

Arsam Tufail Butt¹

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization.

¹ Arsam Tufail Butt is a Research Associate at the BNU Center for Policy Research (BCPR), with experience in legislative development, democratic governance, and civic engagement. His work focuses on policy research, legislative processes, and stakeholder engagements across government institutions, civil society organizations, and donor-funded initiatives, with particular interest related to governance and institutional development.

BCPR POLICY BRIEF
THE BOARD OF PEACE:
STRUCTURE, POLITICAL LOGIC, AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Board of Peace (BoP), launched under the Trump administration's Gaza plan and endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2803, held its inaugural meeting on 19 February 2026, announcing USD 17 billion in reconstruction pledges and troop contributions for a 20,000-strong International Stabilization Force. The BoP centralizes authority in a single U.S. chairman, links influence to financial contributions, and envisions global conflict intervention beyond its UN mandate, prompting concern from major Western allies, several of whom declined full membership. Pledges fall well short of the UN's USD 60–70 billion reconstruction estimates, and Palestinians remain deeply skeptical. The meeting highlighted the BoP as a high-profile but structurally fragile, American-led initiative whose effectiveness will hinge on Israeli compliance, Hamas's trajectory, and the translation of commitments into tangible outcomes for Gaza's population.

BOARD OF PEACE AT A GLANCE

DIMENSION	KEY FACTS
Proposal & UN Backing	Trump's 20-point Gaza Comprehensive Plan endorsed by UNSCR 2803 (November 17, 2025); BoP named as lead transitional body.
Charter Signing	January 22, 2026, World Economic Forum, Davos -- 26 founding members signed on.
Inaugural Meeting	February 19, 2026, Donald J. Trump U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.
Funding Pledged	USD 7 billion from nine-member states + USD 10 billion U.S. pledge. UN estimates full reconstruction at USD 60–70 billion.
Stabilization Force	Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Morocco — 20,000 troops pledged. Egypt & Jordan to train 12,000 Palestinian police.

Governance Body	National Committee for Administration of Gaza (NCAG) headed by Ali Shaath; High Representative Nikolay Mladenov oversees execution.
Notable Absences	France, Germany, UK, Canada (uninvited), Norway, Slovenia, Sweden declined. Most major EU allies as observers only.
Core Tension	Charter does not mention Gaza. Broad mandate raises fears of UN sidelining. No Palestinian representatives on Executive Board.

I. GENESIS: FROM CEASEFIRE PLAN TO INTERNATIONAL BODY

On 19 February 2025, U.S. President Donald J. Trump convened the inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace in Washington, D.C., formally activating a new executive-led diplomatic mechanism designed to reshape the United States’ approach to conflict resolution. Established through an executive directive earlier that month, the Board represents a structural departure from traditional multilateral peace processes that rely on consensus-driven frameworks and institutional checks within bodies such as the United Nations. US officials presented the first meeting as the launch of a results-oriented peace architecture intended to circumvent what they described as bureaucratic inertia in existing international mechanisms. The Board was framed as an instrument for accelerating ceasefire implementation, stabilization planning, and reconstruction in conflict-affected territories. Its creation reflects a broader recalibration in U.S. foreign policy under President Trump: consolidating executive authority in diplomacy, linking financial contributions to governance influence, and constructing parallel diplomatic platforms that operate alongside, but not within, established multilateral institutions².

The origins of the Board, however, predate its February 2025 launch. It was not the product of standing multilateral negotiations but rather a proposal engineered within U.S. negotiating channels. The concept appeared as point nine of a 20-point “*Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict*,” which the United States, Hamas, and Israel accepted during negotiations in September and October 2025. The plan received formal international recognition on 17 November 2025 when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803 by a vote of 13–0, with Russia and China abstaining. The resolution endorsed the Board of Peace as a transitional

² Executive Directive Establishing the Board of Peace, White House, February 2025.

administrative mechanism for Gaza but narrowly defined its mandate as one of reconstruction coordination. It did not authorize the Board to function as a global conflict-resolution body³.

The Board's institutionalization proceeded rapidly. On 22 January 2026, its charter was formally signed at the 56th Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, with 26 founding member states. President Trump presided over the ceremony and described the Board as one of the most consequential bodies ever created. The White House portrayed the event as the beginning of a new governance model for Gaza, one premised on market-driven reconstruction rather than traditional aid dependency⁴. Notably, the language of the charter extends beyond the limits contemplated in Security Council Resolution 2803. It grants the Board authority to act wherever it determines that "stability or lawful governance is at risk," a formulation that imposes no explicit geographic limitation. In Davos, President Trump stated that once fully formed, the Board "could do pretty much whatever it wants to do", reinforcing the perception that its intended scope may exceed the narrowly defined transitional role endorsed by the UN. The divergence between the Security Council's limited authorization and the charter's expansive language introduces a structural ambiguity at the heart of the Board's mandate. It raises questions about institutional coherence, legal boundaries, and the extent to which the Board is intended to evolve from a Gaza-specific reconstruction mechanism into a standing executive-led instrument of global peace intervention⁵.

II. STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE OF BOARD

The governance architecture of the Board of Peace reflects an unusually centralized and executive-driven model. Chaired permanently by U.S. President Donald J. Trump, the Board consolidates ultimate authority within the presidency. The executive directive issued by the White House establishes a vertically organized structure in which the President retains agenda-setting control, sole veto authority over resolutions, and the power to invite, exclude, or

³ Arab Center Washington DC, "Trump's Board of Peace: Rebuilding Gaza, or Remaking the World?", February 2026, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/trumps-board-of-peace-rebuilding-gaza-or-remaking-the-world/>

⁴ White House, "President Trump Ratifies Board of Peace in Historic Ceremony, Opening Path to Hope and Dignity for Gazans," January 22, 2026, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2026/01/president-trump-ratifies-board-of-peace-in-historic-ceremony-opening-path-to-hope-and-dignity-for-gazans/>

⁵ TIME Magazine, "Trump Unveils Gaza 'Board of Peace' at Davos," January 22, 2026, <https://time.com/7357067/trump-gaza-board-of-peace-members-davos/>

suspend member states. The chairmanship is designated for life, relinquished only voluntarily or by incapacitation, reinforcing the personalist character of the institution⁶.

Structurally, the Board operates across three tiers. At the apex sits the Board proper, composed of invited national leaders. Beneath it functions the Executive Board, a seven-member body appointed by the President and tasked with strategic diplomacy and investment coordination. At the operational level is the Gaza Executive Board, headed by Bulgarian diplomat Nikolay Mladenov as High Representative for Gaza. This body oversees the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), a transitional technocratic authority led by Ali Shaath, a former Palestinian Authority deputy minister, responsible for day-to-day governance pending institutional reform and the prospective return of the Palestinian Authority. The Gaza Executive Board includes figures such as Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff, former UN envoy Sigrid Kaag, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Qatari Minister Ali al-Thawadi, and Egyptian General Hassan Rashad. Notably absent are Palestinian representatives at the Executive Board level, while Israel holds a seat. This asymmetry complicates the Board's claims to neutrality and raises structural concerns regarding representation and impartiality⁷.

The Board's charter further institutionalizes a contribution-based membership model. States are granted an initial three-year membership, renewable upon a financial contribution of US\$1 billion. Voting privileges correspond to financial commitments, embedding capital directly into governance authority. European responses have been cautious. As of the inaugural phase, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Slovenia, and Spain declined full membership. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas⁸ observed that the charter makes no reference to the scope limitations, time-frame restrictions, or Palestinian participation requirements outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2803. The omission reinforces concerns that the Board's expansive internal mandate diverges from the narrower transitional role endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. Critics have also characterized the financial contribution for voting rights as a monetization of international legitimacy, replacing sovereign equality with transactional influence.

⁶ Charter of the Board of Peace, Section IV: Membership and Voting Structure, 2025.

⁷ Middle East Monitor, "A Stunted Start Marks the Inaugural Board for Peace in Gaza," February 20, 2026, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260220-a-stunted-start-marks-the-inaugural-board-for-peace-in-gaza/>

⁸ Kaja Kallas, Munich Security Conference, February 2026. Full transcript via MSC official record.

III. THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF 19 FEBRUARY 2026

On 19 February 2026, the inaugural Board of Peace summit in Washington gathered around 48 delegations, half full members and half observers, where President Trump announced USD 17 billion in pledges for Gaza reconstruction, USD 10 billion from the United States and USD 7 billion collectively from nine other states, falling far short of the UN and EU-World Bank estimate of USD 60–70 billion. Several countries committed troops to a 20,000-strong International Stabilization Force, with Indonesia offering up to 8,000, while Egypt and Jordan pledged to train a 12,000-member Palestinian police force, which had already drawn 2,000 applicants⁹. The event, held at the former U.S. Institute of Peace renamed in President Trump's honor as *Donald J. Trump U.S. Institute of Peace*, was heavily theatrical: Trump praised leaders on wealth and appearance, distributed MAGA hats, and opened proceedings to James Brown's "It's a Man's Man's Man's World," prompting critics to liken it to a corporate board meeting rather than diplomacy. Israel attended at ministerial level only, with Prime Minister Netanyahu absent due to an ICC arrest warrant, coinciding with Trump issuing a 10-day ultimatum signaling potential military action against Iran. Meanwhile, Palestinians on the ground expressed deep skepticism: residents in Gaza, including displaced individuals like Amal Joudeh and Awad al-Ghoul, questioned both the Board's authority and the pledges, noting ongoing Israeli strikes that have killed over 600 people since the October 2025 ceasefire, continued restrictions on goods, expansion of buffer zones, and the detention of over 10,000 Palestinians, highlighting a profound disconnect between high-profile international commitments and the lived realities of Gaza's population¹⁰.

IV. STRUCTURAL TENSIONS AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

The Board of Peace represents a deliberate departure from traditional multilateralism, reflecting President Trump's long-standing criticism of the United Nations and its peacekeeping apparatus. Rather than reforming existing UN mechanisms, the Board establishes a parallel executive-led structure that derives authority from presidential directive and participating-state agreements, not collective Security Council mandates. This raises immediate legal and operational questions: stabilization missions would rely on host-state consent and coalition arrangements rather than binding international authority, while potential

⁹ Remarks on International Peace Institutions Reform, Donald J. Trump, January 2025.


¹⁰ Al Jazeera, "In Gaza, Trump's Board of Peace Met with Deep Scepticism, Little Hope," February 20, 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/2/20/in-gaza-trumps-board-of-peace-met-with-deep-scepticism-little-hope>

overlap with UN operations remains undefined, creating risks of duplication, mandate conflict, and political friction.

The Board’s centralized design prioritizes rapid decision-making and financial leverage over consensus. By embedding contribution-based voting, it converts reconstruction pledges into governance influence, allowing the United States to anchor control while distributing financial responsibility. This approach accelerates resource mobilization but undermines traditional notions of normative legitimacy rooted in impartiality and sovereign equality. Executive centralization also ties the Board’s continuity to presidential tenure, exposing it to potential policy reversals and instability absent insulation from electoral cycles.

International reactions have been mixed. Middle powers showed conditional interest, while major European states, including France, Germany, the UK, and Canada, declined full membership, citing divergence from UN-authorized mandates¹¹ and concerns over Palestinian non-inclusion. The absence of these states leaves the Board dependent on Gulf funding and non-Western troop contributions, raising doubts about its leverage over Israel or influence on Hamas. Early coalition-building focused more on signaling resolve than resolving legitimacy gaps, leaving the Board’s operational credibility uncertain.

Structural tensions extend beyond membership. The Board’s mandate surpasses the limited transitional authority endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, with language granting it



¹¹ Statement on Alternative Peace Governance Mechanisms, European External Action Service, February 2025.

authority wherever it determines “stability or lawful governance is at risk,” yet Palestinians are excluded from the Gaza Executive Board while Israel holds a seat. This asymmetry undermines impartiality and questions the Board’s claim as an honest broker. Claims that Hamas has been neutralized are contradicted by its ongoing control over taxation, security, and municipal governance in areas outside Israeli control, demonstrating that territorial and administrative authority remains contested.

Financial and operational gaps compound these structural issues. The US\$17 billion pledged covers only a fraction of the estimated US\$60–70 billion required for reconstruction, and no independent oversight, disbursement mechanism, or timeline for Israeli withdrawal and Hamas disarmament was presented. Visual plans, such as Kushner’s AI-generated renderings, offered the most concrete indication of intent but lacked operational realism. In combination, these factors highlight that the Board, while rhetorically ambitious, faces significant credibility, legitimacy, and execution challenges that threaten its ability to function as a meaningful peace and reconstruction actor.

V. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Establish a fully transparent, independently audited disbursement framework for all pledged reconstruction funds to ensure accountability and prevent mismanagement.
2. Integrate meaningful Palestinian representation or consultative mechanisms within the Gaza Executive Board to enhance legitimacy and local ownership of decisions.
3. Clearly define and constrain the Board’s mandate with explicit alignment to UN Charter principles on global peace and security.
4. Implement robust mechanisms to hold Israel accountable for ceasefire violations, including lethal strikes, buffer zone expansions, and restrictions on goods, to preserve operational credibility.
5. Engage absent Western powers strategically, leveraging their financial and technical capacity while insisting that the Board operates within UN-established constraints, and advance parallel UN reforms to maintain multilateral legitimacy.
6. Position the Board as a complementary mechanism to the UN, avoiding institutional competition, to safeguard long-term legitimacy and avoid eroding existing international frameworks.

CONCLUSION

The 19 February 2025 inaugural meeting of the Board of Peace established a U.S.-led conflict mediation model that is structurally distinct, centralizing authority in the executive branch and tying governance influence to financial contributions. Its strategic aim, to reduce procedural delays, accelerate capital mobilization, and link reconstruction to security benchmarks, is clear, but the model is fraught with structural vulnerabilities. The Board lacks institutional insulation, its legal standing is ambiguous, and its continuity depends entirely on the U.S. executive. The inaugural meeting underscored the central paradox: The Board is simultaneously the most consequential international initiative for Gaza's future and the least structurally prepared to deliver it. Pledges and troop commitments exist but are insufficient or premature, while governance excludes Palestinian representation, undermining both legitimacy and operational credibility.

The Board's future hinges on whether it can convert executive authority and financial leverage into durable, recognized peace outcomes without exacerbating fragmentation in global governance. While Gulf financing, non-Western troop contributions, and a fragile ceasefire provide the raw material for action, the absence of enforceable accountability, moral consistency, and impartial oversight leaves the initiative highly precarious. Without these elements, the Board risks remaining a political instrument rather than a functional peace mechanism. Its success, or failure, will define whether this experiment in executive-driven, contribution-weighted peace governance becomes a model for future conflicts or a cautionary example of selective multilateralism undermining legitimacy in fragile regions.



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Main Campus

13 KM, Off Thokar Niaz Baig
Raiwind Road, Lahore-53700, Pakistan
Telephone: 042-38100156
www.bnu.edu.pk